Gumii Paarlaamaa Oromoo (GPO)
Oromo Parliamentarians Council (OPC)
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Prof. Asafa Jalata*?
This paper examines the essence and characteristics of cities and
urban centers in Oromia (see maps 1 and 2) and the major
consequences of the centralization and spatial concentration of
Habasha (Amhara-Tigray) political power in a multinational
In addition to exclusion, the Oromos have been prevented from developing autonomous institutions, organizations, culture, and language, and have been subordinated to the institutions and organizations of the Habasha colonial settlers in their own cities, towns, and homeland. the issues of the Oromo urbanites cannot be suf- !ciently explained without locating them within larger problems of the colonization of Oromia by the alliance of Ethiopian settler colonialism and global imperialism. This paper explores four interrelated issues: First, it outlines methodological and theoretical narratives. Second, the paper specially explains the evolution of indigenous Oromo urban centers and their integration into the Ethiopian colonial structure and the development of garrison and non-garrison cities and towns in Oromia. Third, it identifes and examines the major consequences of the spatial concentration of Amhara-Tigray political power in the Oromo and Habasha urban communities in Oromia. Finally, the paper explains the features of Oromian urban communities, the process of urban underdevelopment, and the elects of political repression and state terrorism on the Oromos.
Addressing the major consequences of the spatial concentration of Habasha political power in the heart Urban Centers in Oromia 41 of Oromian cities and urban centers is a di%cult and complex task because of the paucity of adequate data1 and the methodological and theoretical challenges one faces due to the problem of dealing with the two contradictory worlds of the Oromos and Habashas that are interconnected and geographically located in the hearts of Oromia. Historical and comparative methods are used to address the root problems and the contradictions between the Oromo and Habasha communities in Oromian cities and urban centers by locating them in the regional and global political economy. These methods assist us in exploring the historical origins and development of pre-colonial and colonial towns in Oromia, and to historically situate, compare, and contrast the quality of life for Oromo and Amhara-Tigray communities in Oromian cities and urban centers. This study uses critical, re-interpretative, comparative, and integrative modes of analyses. By using an integrative and critical theoretical framework, this research interconnects structural, cultural and behavioural approaches to explain the processes of policy formation and political action in order to determine why there are deferential qualities of life and public services in the colonized and colonizing urban communities. Primarily structural approaches are rooted in Marxian and Weberian modes of analyses that focus on the impact of socio-economic relations in shaping political structures and policies (see DiGaetano and Storm 2003, Skocpol 1973). Structural analysts are concerned with “historically rooted and materially based processes of distribution, con&ict, power, and domination, thought to drive social order and social change” (Lichbach 1997, 248). The political economy approach, as one aspect of tural modes of analyses, helps in identifying and explaining chains of factors that facilitate large-scale and longterm social, cultural, political, and economic changes.
Analysts who adopt the political economy approach assume that “the most signi!cant processes shaping human identities, interests, and interaction are such large-scale features of modernity as capitalist development, market rationality, state-building, secularization, political and scientifc revolution, and the acceleration of instruments for the communication and disunions of ideas” (Katznelson 1997, 83). The structural or political economy approach does not adequately explain the behavioral and institutional forms of the Ethiopian colonial elites and state structures.
Cultural analysis of political systems however can be used to explain the behavioral and institutional forms of the colonizing structure. #is analytic approach provides assistance in understanding the basic values, symbols and belief systems that provide “a system of meaning that people use to manage their daily worlds, large and small; . . . culture is the basis and political identity that afects how people line up and how they act on wide range of matters” (Ross 1997, 42). According to Alan DiGaetano and Elizabeth Strom (2003, 360), “culture is linked to governance by ideological constructions through which participants in the political process interpret local events. Such ideological orientations also provide the core values upon which policy decisions are made.” C. Stone (1989, 6) notes that governments are based on “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions.” Through integrating the structural context, political culture, and political behavior in complex sets of relations and networks that DiGaetano and Strom (2003, 263) call “the institutional milieus,” we can explore the impact of the Ethiopian colonial institutions in general and garrison cities and towns in particular on the Oromo urbanites. According to DiGaetano and Strom (2003, 263),
Institutional milieus are the complexes of formal and informal political and governmental arrangements that mediate interactions among the structural contexts, political culture, and political actors. Formal institutional arrangements . . . include the governmental bodies . . . and partnerships that give visible form to urban governance through rules and organization. Modes of go!ernance [emphasis in original] are the informal arrangements that de!ne the governing relationships among and within formal institutions implicated in urban politics.
The integration of structural, cultural, and behavioural theoretical
approaches is necessary to examine critically the situations of
Oromo and Habasha communities in Oromian cities and urban centers.
This section explains the evolution of indigenous Oromo urban
centers, and how these centers became the centers of Ethiopian
colonial institutions and were used to dominate, control and exploit
the Oromo people. Urban centers developed in pre-colonial Oromia
because of the development of the division of labor and the
emergence of internal contradictions in Oromo society. Pre-colonial
Oromia had a small number of urban centers because of the
egalitarian political economy of Oromo society which was similar to
what Karl Polanyi (1944, 47-48) calls “reciprocity and
redistribution.” Urban centers and cities emerged in class-based
societies: “Without a central power and a mechanism to generate a
surplus over consumption and to concentrate it into urban areas,
cities cannot grow” (Gilbert and Gugler 1995, 14). Historian Tesema
Ta’a (1994, 678) asserts that in
The town of
leader of the Leeqaa Naqamte, Bakare Godana established a hereditary local Oromo kingdom of Leeqaa, ruling approximately between 1841 and 1868, Map 1: Oromia in the 1850s Source: Mitchell, S. Augustus A System of Modern Geography (Philadelphia: J.H. Butler and Company, 1875). by destroying the Oromo democratic system of administration. He developed Naqamte into a permanent place and town. As soon as Bakare Godana “was elected as the abba duulaa [war leader] of the Na’a lineage group, [he] immediately started to ignore the basic tenets of the customary gadaa rules and regulations and [undermined] the superior powers of the abba boku [the main leader]. He gathered many followers and organized them into an efective [strike] force and entered into repeated con- &icts with Fido Bokkisa, the contemporary abba boku”
(Ta’a 1994, 677). Bakare forced Fido Bokkisa to &ee, controlling areas around Naqamte, such as Waacha.3 Bakare established this settlement and consolidated his political and social organization by recruiting permanent body guards and soldiers. When he died in 1868, about 2000 people lived around Naqamte (Ta’a 1994, 678). #e development and enlargement of Naqamte continued under the administration of his successors Moroda Bakare (r. 1868-1889) and Kumsa Moroda (1889-1923). It was during Kumsa’s administration that European travelers, merchants, and a few Ethiopians visited Naqamate and provided eyewitness accounts on the town. During the last decade of the nineteenth century, Weld Blundel (1900, 13), a British traveler, noted that “Nakamte is a large scattered town of some 40,000 inhabitants, situated on an undulating ground, with all the evidence of prosperity. All kinds of produce corn and honey being principal and large quantities of cotton . . . iron and copper metal from the west are to be seen in the market.” Another traveler, Hugues Le Roux (1902, 310-311), a French traveler, was amazed by the buildings in Naqamte and their various shapes
and sizes. He witnessed that “a high density of population living in compact villages in and around” the city (quoted in Ta’a 1994, 680). C.W. Major Gwynn (1937) admired how Naqamte was &ourishing. Further, E.J. Bartleet (1934, 65) described how this city had commercial networks with Gojjam, Shawa, Bella Shangul, the Sudan, and Dembi Dollo, and had developed into an important and prosperous city. Adrien Zervos (1936, 397-399) described that because Naqamte was a very signicant commercial center about seventy foreign merchants established import-export agencies in the city.
The foreign merchants included Indians, Greeks, Lebanese, Armenians,
Americans, and Arabs. The Swedish Evangelical Missionaries also
opened a church, a hospital, and an elementary school in the city.
#ere were indigenous settlements and towns similar to Nagamte in
other parts of Oromia. Towns like Saqa, Jimma, Billo, Assandabo,
Dappo, and Dembi Dollo developed during the nineteenth century.
South of Naqamte, Saqa emerged as the seat of the ruler of Limmu and
as a local market in the early nineteenth century. As a center of
commerce, Saqa was connected to Kafa and other Oromo kingdoms,
Saqa declined in the late nineteenth century because of the
weakening of the
Another urban center that emerged in the late nineteenth century was
Dembi Dollo; this town also evolved from a marketplace. Afer
struggling with its competitors, such as Abba Ghimbi, Abba Dassa and
Burayu, Jote Tulu of Gidami brought Dembi Dollo under his
administration (Tadasse 1983). Afer the death of Jote in 1918,
Leeqaa Qellem and Sayyoo fell under the direct control of the
Abyssinian colonial administration, and Habasha settlers began to
arrive and establish the nafxayna-gabbar system. #e expropriation of
Oromo lands by Ethiopian colonial settlers, and the intensi!cation
of taxation, and the inability of Oromos to pay heavy taxes forced
many of them to migrate to Dembi Dollo in search of jobs, such as
porterage (Tadasse 1983, 26). the Greeks introduced new ways of
constructing houses; sawmills; the knowledge of making blocks of
sandstone; production of various fruits and crops, such as rice,
mangoes, bananas, oranges, apricots, etc.; sewing and sewing
machines; bakeries; hotels; cheese making; and so forth. there were
also other Europeans and Americans who introduced some innovations
to the city of
Land alienation and heavy land taxes forced Oromos to seek employment with Greek merchants, and poor Oromos became porters to transport goods between Dembi Dollo and Gambella. The first missionaries were medical doctors who combined religious gospel and medicine; they trained Oromo teachers and preachers to spread the Christian gospel among the Oromo community of the region. #ere are other pre-conquest Oromian cities that are not included in this paper due to lack of data. Afer Oromia was efectively colonized by the Habasha, indigenous Oromo urban centers were converted into garrison towns and became the center of the Ethiopian colonial administration. In these processes Oromos became a numerical and political minority in their own urban centers and culturally and economically subordinated to Habasha communities as we will see below.
The chains of factors that facilitated the development of both
garrison and non-garrison cities and towns (see Map 2) included
capitalist penetration; Abyssinian colonial expansion, including the
need to control strategic centers and the caravan trade as well as
natural and human resources; the introduction of innovations, such
as the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line (see Map 2); and modern
transportation and communication systems (see Benti 1988, 2000;
Jalata 1993; Koehn and Koehn 1979). Alan Gilbert and Josef Gugler
(1995, 16) note that “without the intrusion of industrial capitalism
and imperialism some third World societies would still lack major
cities. In major parts of
Gilbert and Gugler (1995,
18) correctly characterize such cities and urban centers as an
“instrument of conquest.” The Ethiopian colonial settlers created
garrison towns and cities known as katamas in strategically and
politically secured regions and brought the existing Oromo urban
centers under their control. John Murray (1922, 35) points that
“Convinced that much more was to be made out of the helpless Galla
[Oromo] by their permanent exploitation, he [Menelik] began . . . to
occupy the districts that he overran with permanent garrisons of his
troops, providing at the same time for their administration under a
hierarchy of his own officials.” Initially, Menelik, the founder of
the Ethiopian Empire, developed garrison towns, such as Ankobar,
Dabra Berhan, and Angolala in the mid-nineteenth century; the last
was burned by the Oromo in 1868, but recovered by Menelik. He also
developed Leche, Feqre Gimb, Enaware, Tamo, and Warra Illu.
Similarly, Yohannes founded Dase in northern Oromia in 1883. Menelik
consolidated his garrison town of
Northern Oromia (north of
The major portion of Oromo land on which this capital city was founded was owned by thirty-one Ethiopian offcials (Pankhurst 1985, 204). the army commanders were given a large plots of lands on which they established their respective camps for their relatives, followers, and war captives (Benti 2000, 64). While most Oromos were evicted and forced to migrate to far places, others were permanently marginalized and turned into servants and laborers (Benti 2000, 278). Some Europeans and others had obtained Oromo lands from Menelik before the merchandization of land by giving him gi+s. However, by the proclamation of October 27, 1907, Oromo land became a commodity to be sold and bought. this proclamation “gave Ethiopian and foreign [European] landlords a great deal more security of tenure” (Garretson 1974, 116). Some of these Europeans bought tracts of land and built their houses, shops, and offices.
Making Addis Ababa the center of commerce, bureaucracy, and employment, the Ethiopian government attracted people from different parts of the world and Abyssinia proper to this city while the Oromo people were marginalized, segregated, and dehumanized in rural and urban areas alike. the people in the city mainly obtained their food and income from the surrounding Oromos; military commanders, soldiers, followers depended on the tribute and tax mainly collected from the Oromo people (Benti 2000, 54). Gradually, Addis Abba gained regional and international importance. Several continental and international organizations made this capital city their center without recognizing the existence and suffering of the Oromo people.
Most countries opened their embassies and nongovernmental agencies
granting concessions to European capitalists, the state introduced
modern innovations, such as a railway, a few roads, a telephone and
telegraph system, a postal system, a bank, the !rst modern school,
and the !rst hospital. By establishing his court in Finfnnee (
Commodities and food products produced by Oromo labor &owed to and
were concentrated in
Akalou Wolde-Michael (1973, 10) describes that with
From these garrison centers Ethiopian soldiers and colonial
administrators were dispatched to impose colonial rule on Oromos
through subjugation, enslavement, and expropriation of the basic
means of production such as land, cattle, and other valuable
resources. With products collected from Oromia and other regions,
Menelik continuously purchased quantities of weapons and military
Several non-garrison towns
emerged in eastern and western Oromia with the development of trade
and communication networks. As rail service was introduced, the
towns of Aqaqi, Bisho+u, Mojo, Adama, Walanchiti, Metahara, Awash,
Mieso, Afdem, Gota, Munesa, and Dire Dawa (see Map 2) &ourished.
While Oromos were evicted from their urban lands and forced to
migrate to rural areas, Abyssinians were encouraged to migrate to
cities and towns in Oromia. These processes were started by Menelik
and have continued into the present. Menelik encouraged the
migration of Abyssinians to the colonized areas in the late
nineteenth century and the turn of the twentieth century. Thgreat
The Ethiopian colonial state made Oromian cities and towns
attractive to Ethiopians by providing them with land and by building
churches, schools, hospitals, and supplying other social amenities.
These favourable conditions enabled the Amharas to become the
majority in most cities and consider themselves as hosts, and Oromos
as outsiders and foreigners (see O’Connor 1983, 108). Social
amenities, such as health services, transportation, and
communication facilities, employment opportunities, industries
concentrated in major cities and urban centers. For instance, there
were 93 health centers and 649 clinics in
Oromos have been denied meaningful access to these hospitals and
other health services, schools, colleges, and universities in
Oromian cities and urban centers. In their own country and urban
centers, Oromos have become foreigners and are even discouraged from
migrating to larger cities (Benti 2001, 159). Oromian cities and
town have been numerically, politically, economically, and
culturally dominated by Abyssinians. For instance, in 1978, about 59
percent of the
In Oromian cities and town, the Oromo language was discouraged and despised and the Amharic language was gloried and became the official language of the Ethiopian empire (see Benti 2001, 158). When people from different parts of the world visit Oromian cities and towns, they don’t come into direct contact with the Oromo people, their culture, history and civilization. As Oromia was removed from the world map by colonization, the Oromo people and their culture were removed from Oromian cities and towns through systematic government policies. The Ethiopian government made the culture and language of the Amhara the symbol and the defning trait of Ethiopian identity and nationalism. It prohibited the writing, broadcasting or speaking at public functions in the Oromo language as a part of its attempt to culturally assimilate the Oromo into the Amhara identity without structurally assimilating them (see Markakis 1994, 225).
The Ethiopian state has been rooted in the Amhara-Tigrayan culture, language and Orthodox Christianity, and these characteristics were reflected in Oromian cities and towns. The Abyssinian colonial settlers created two worlds in different centers of Oromia: The world of those who have socially, politically, economically, and culturally dominated Oromian cities and towns, and the world of the people who lost their country and have become marginalized and impoverished. Only a few Oromos, who have collaborated with the Ethiopian colonial system, have escaped this humiliation. The Ethiopian government made it a requirement that Oromos and others who sought “upward mobility must do so within the Amhara cultural framework” (Shack 1973, 276).
Until they learned to speak Amharic, Oromos were denied employment in the government bureaucracy and the service industry (Benti 2001, 158-161). But ordinary Amharas and Tigrayans even without formal education could get di$erent kinds of jobs in Oromian cities and towns because they spoke Amharic and they were members of the ethnonational group that dominated the institutions of government and business (Benti 2001, 161). In the early 1960s, Girma Amare (1963, 340), an Amhara bureaucrat, declared that Oromos and others “wishing to obtain a position in government offices [are] required to have a good command of Amharic.” More than 60 percent of government bureaucrats, 75 of army o%cers, and 70 percent of governors in the colonized regions were Amharas by 1974 (Michael 1989, 71).
Most of these positions are !lled by Tigrayans today, since they took state power from the Amharas in 1991. Because the Oromos in cities and towns and rural areas do not have institutional and organizational control over their land and what they produce and their labor, they do not receive the benefts that can improve their quality of life. The Oromos live under Ethiopian political repression, darkness of ignorance, and poverty.4 Since urban areas and cities in Oromia are primarily populated by Ethiopian colonial settlers and their collaborators, they are the ones who have access to the limited public facilities such as schools and hospitals. Oromo urbanites like their rural counterparts have been exposed to massive and absolute poverty and have been denied their fundamental human rights and needs that Ron Shifman (1995, 6-8) calls subsistence, protection, afection, and understanding. Most Oromos
in urban and rural areas have low levels of subsistence because they lack adequate income, enough food, and livable homes. They do not have protection from disease because they are denied adequate access to health and medical services. They do not have protection from political violence because the Ethiopian state engages in massive human rights violations and state terrorism ( Jalata 2000). Oromos have been ruled by successive authoritarian-terrorist regimes5 which have exploited and impoverished them by expropriating their resources.
Successive Ethiopian regimes have not had any concern and affection for the Oromo people because they have been considered inferior people who do not deserve basic human rights ( Jalata 2001). Oromos have been denied their inalienable right to self-determination and democracy. They have been denied the right to build their social, economic, cultural and organizational infrastructure. Without political freedom, democracy, and a legitimate government, a community cannot improve its quality of life. People like the Oromos who do not have personal and public safety in their homes and communities, and who are denied the freedom of expression, association, and organization, are denied a good quality of life. In the twenty !rst century, when the world is changing quickly because of the intensifcation of globalization, social revolutions, as well as revolutions in technology, information, communication, and transportation, the Oromo people are relegated to the darkness of ignorance and poverty. Because of the magnitude of the problems of the Oromo people, it is impossible to provide a numerical face to the devastating effects of poverty, suffering, hunger, malnutrition, starvation, sickness, illiteracy and ignorance, alienation, and hopelessness.
Because the majority of Oromo urbanites face these problems, they are underdeveloped.6 When a community or a society lacks independence or autonomy to determine its political destiny through self-determination and democracy, it is confronted with the problems of underdevelopment, which is characterized as powerlessness, victimization, illiteracy, poverty, and other forms of socioeconomic crises (see Rodney 1982).
Beginning in the 1960s, the migration of a few Oromos to urban areas
brought about some changes. These migrants brought the Oromo
language and culture to Oromian cities and towns. Some Oromo elites
who were trained to be intermediaries started to recognize their
lack of equal citizenship rights and the mistreatment of the Oromo
people. Despite their individual achievements, these elites were
given an inferior status to Ethiopians due to their Oromo identity.
They started to form urban self-help associations because organizing
a political party was not allowed. These self-help associations were
united to form the Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association. The formation
of the Macha-Tulama Self- Help Association in the year 1963-1964
marked the beginning of building urban community efforts to solve
Oromo problems and the public rise of Oromo nationalism. The Oromo
elites, by forming this association in
In May 1966, the leaders of the association at one of its meetings, articulated that: “(1) less than one percent of Oromo school age children ever get the opportunity to go to school; (2) . . . less than one percent of the Oromo population get adequate medical services; (3) . . . less than !+y percent of the Oromo population own land [currently all Oromos are landless since the Ethiopian state owns Oromo land]; (4) . . . a very small percentage of the Oromo population has access to communication services. [And yet] the Oromo paid more than eighty percent of the taxes for education, health, and communication” (/uoted in Hassen 1998, 205-206).
The Ethiopian colonial state and the Ethiopian settlers in Oromia
did not tolerate any manifestation of Oromo identity by either
association or organization. To stop the development of Oromo
consciousness and collective efforts, the Ethiopian government
banned the Macha and Tulama Association in 1967, killed or
imprisoned its leaders, and prevented Oromo urbanites from
organizing and developing their communities. #e banning of this
association forced Oromo nationalism to go underground. These events
forced some Oromo nationalists to go underground in Oromia; others
the beginning of the twenty !rst century, in third World countries
Under these conditions, the chance to improve the quality of life through investing in Oromo communities is nonexistent. By dominating the Ethiopian political economy and centralizing and concentrating state power, successive Ethiopian regimes have formulated and implemented policies that beneft Habasha elites at the expense of Oromos and other colonized peoples. Ethiopian rulers, Menelik, Haile Selassie, Mengistu Haile Mariam, and Meles Zenawi, have caused the destruction of millions of lives to promote “their own personal advancement over and above the goals and aspirations of their followers and Ethiopians in general” (Hagos 1995, vii). These leaders have been more concerned with a “ferocious love of material and worldly comfort,” while ignoring the welfare of the people (Hagos 1995, 131).
They have privatized and ethnicized public power, and used it for
destroying rather than building a country. The fundamental
resolution of the contradictions between Oromo and Habasha urban
communities requires the implementation of the principles of self
determination and multicultural democracy. Without an accountable,
democratic and legitimate state, various population groups in
Oromian cities and towns and the colonized regions may soon face
dangerous conditions similar to
Today millions of Oromos are exposed to fatal diseases (including HIV/AID), famine and massive poverty in Oromian cities and urban centers. Since state-terrorism, poverty, famine, and ethnonational challenges are increasing and since the major world powers have a role in shaping these problems, they have a moral and political responsibility to become capable of mediating these processes and developing procedures and criteria by which these conficts must be solved fairly and democratically before it is too late. On its part, while promoting the principles of self-determination and democracy, the Oromo leadership must demonstrate that the Oromo people because of their democratic tradition, demographic size, geographic location, and cultural ties with other oppressed ethnonations can play their constructive role in establishing a multinational democratic society and in bringing a just and durable peace.
Whether they like it or not, the fates of Oromo and Habasha urban communities in Oromia are interconnected. Therefore, these two communities should start a constructive dia- logue as equal partners and search for a common ground to work together to reorganize the existing urban political and economic arrangements to improve the quality of life, social services, and community development for all the people without exclusion and discrimination. As Habasha urban communities need to dissociate themselves from the ethnocratic Ethiopian state, the Oromo urbanites need to make constant eforts to demonstrate that they can democratically work with the Habasha communities without revenge and exclusion.
1. These sensitive issues have been avoided by Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority. Because of censorship by the Ethiopian government, Oromo scholars and others who are interested in Oromo issues cannot collect information on the disparities in quality of life and public services between Oromo and Amhara communities in Oromia.
2. Naqamte was the center of gadaa at which the Leeqaa Oromos and their elected leaders administered their economic, political and religious services. It was there where “the gada officials gave justice deliberated on the defense of their territory and held prayers in cases of bad harvest ... or epidemic diseases” (Ta’a, 1994: 677).
3. Bakare Godana chose Wacha as the place of his residence because of the following reasons: Waacha was rich in water supply since it was surrounded by streams and springs. It was also economically rich because it was located near the Handaq forest which was endowed by resources such as ivory, cotton, honey, and other valuable products. Waacha had also a strategic significance since it was easy to attack or control the movement of the enemy from there.
4. It is superfcial to discuss about the quality of life and public
services in Oromian cities and towns without having some
understanding of the general political, economic, and social
conditions in the Ethiopian Empire. In the early 1990s, out of the
total population of 53,130,780, only 7,315687 were living in urban
areas (Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority, 1994: 41). Economic
and health indicators of
5. #e policies of the Ethiopian state are diferent in
6. #e 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia do not provide vital information on education, poverty and disease in relation to ethnonational groups.
7. #ese pamphlets include Kana Beekta? and the Oromos: Voice Against Tyranny. For the first time the original name of this people, Oromo was used in publication by rejecting the derogatory name, Galla.
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Journal of Oromo Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2010), pp. 39-74.
Asafa Jalata is Professor of Sociology and, Global Studies, and Interim Chair
of Africana Studies at the
and edited eight books, including Contending Nationalisms of Oromia and
" (2010), Oromummaa: Oromo Culture, Identity, and Nationalism
(2007), Oromia and
1968-2004, (2005, ), State Crises, Globalisation, and National Mo!ement
in North-East A#
and Globalization: Comparing the A#ican American and Oromo Mo!ements
(2001), Oromo nationalism and the Ethiopian Democracy: $e Search of
Freedom and Democracy" (1998). He also published a dozen book chapters
and numerous refereed articles in major scholarly journals.
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